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I. INTRODUCTION 
Society has become increasingly concerned with the question as to 
how one evaluates the siting of technologically sophsticated projects 
which provide social benefits over a wide region but also may impose sig- 
nificant costs on certain groups. The recent debates on the future of 
nuclear power plants as a source of energy throughout the world 
highlights this point. A less publicized set of decisions is the siting of 
liquefied energy gas terminals in different parts of the world, the particu- 
lar technology which serves as an illustrative example in t h s  paper 
'The research report in this paper  i s  supported by the Bundesministeriurn fuer Forschung 
und Technologic, F.R.G., contract  no. 321/?591/RGD 8001. While support for ths work is 
gratefully acknowledged, the views expressed are the  author 's  and not necessa:rily shared by 
t h e  sponsor. This paper is par t  of a larger project a group of us a t  IlASA are  undertaking 
with respect t o  siting decisions of Liquefied Natural Gas facilities. The ideas presented here 
reflect helpful discussions with my IIASA colleagues--John Lathrop, Joanne Linnerooth and 
Nino Pajone-as well as with ])avid Bell and Louis Miller. 
There are two primary features associated with these proposed pro- 
jects which make them particularly difficult to structure analytically. 
First the decision affects many different individuals and groups in society 
rather than being confined to the normal relationship of a private market 
transaction such as when a consumer purchases food or an appliance 
from a store or firm. In the siting decision, each interested party has its 
own objectives, attributes, data base and constraints (Keeney 1980). 
A second feature of these problems is the absence of a detailed sta- 
tistical data base on the variety of different risks associated with either 
investing or not investing in a particular project. For example, if the con- 
struction of a nuclear power plant or LNG terminal is approved, then 
environmental and safety risks are created. By not building the project 
there are economic risks with respect to the future cost of energy to 
residences and businesses. Each interested party is thus likely to provide 
different estimates of the uncertainties and consequences of these risks. 
Hence it is particularly difficult to utilize what Majone and Quade (1980) 
call statistical rules of evidence to settle these differences. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework for investlgating 
societal problems which have the above two characteristics. Section I1 
provides a set of concepts which are relevant for characterizing the deci- 
sion making process. In Section I11 these concepts are integrated into a 
descriptive model of choice, a multi-attribute multi-party model (MAMP) 
which has been developed a t  IIASA for s.tructuring the process for siting 
LNG terminals in four different countries (Kunreuther, Lathrop, and Lin- 
nerooth 1981). The model will be illustrated using the California siting 
case. Section IV discusses how the current facility siting decision process 
might be improved 
11. -ANT CONCEPTS FOR A DESCRIPTIYE MODEL OF CHOICE 
DIFFERENT INTERESTED PARTIES 
Facility siting debates vary in detail but there are a well defined set  
of stakeholders who can be classified into one of four general groups dep- 
icted in Figure 1. Let us briefly look a t  each of these interested parties in 
turn  to better  understand why potential conflict is likely to result when a 
specific project is proposed. 
Government 
Agencies 
Potential 
The Applicant Process Site 
Conflict 
( Public Interest I 
Groups 
Figure 1. Relevant interested parties in facility siting decision. 
The Applicant 
Firms or developers who support the construction and operation of a 
facility have concluded that  despite future uncertainties, the expected 
profits associated with the project exceed the potential costs. Their posi- 
tion is likely to be based on economic factors, although they may also be 
concerned with the safety risk. 
Proposed Site ( s )  
Residents in a community that  has been proposed as a possible site 
will have differing views of the situation. Those who own the property 
where the project is to be constructed have to determine whether the  
price the developer offers them is attractive enough. If the developer has 
eminent domain power (e.g.,  a public utility) then these residents may be 
concerned that a court will not award them a fair price for their property 
(O'Hare 1977). Others in the  community may focus on the reduced pro- 
perty taxes or increased employment that  a facility is likely to bring and 
hence favor the action. A third group may be concerned with the  
increased safety risk created by the facility and oppose the project. 
Government Agencies 
State and federal government agencies normally play the role of 
referee or arbiter in the decision making process, even though in many 
cases they have a n  interest in a particular outcome. Their regulatory 
actions, whlch are often constrained by legislation, influence the nature 
and distribution of the public's preferences and provide advantages to 
some interests relative to others (Jackson and Kunreuther 1981) 
Public I n t e r e s t  Groups  
Recently we have seen the rise of very intense public interest groups. 
These organizations generally represent the interests and preference of 
one component of the public. For example, the membership of the Sierra 
Club is concerned with the effects that the siting of any new facility w~ll  
have on the environment. Wilson (1975) and Mitchell (1979) have pointed 
out that  those attracted to such organizations have strong, particular 
interests whch dictate the agenda of the organization and influence the 
type of information that is collected and processed. 
It should be clear from these brief descriptions that there is consid- 
erable room for potential conflict between groups once a spec~2ic site is 
proposed as an option. The relative influence of each of the parties in the 
process will depend on their composition as well as how well-defined thelr 
objectives are. Olson (1971) postulates that each person in a group allo- 
cates time and energy in proportion to the expected benefits (s)he 
receives. If t h s  assumption is true, then it is less likely that individuals 
will devote more effort to suppbrting a group's cause as the size of the 
group decreases and the amount a t  stake for each ind.ividua1 increases. 
Greater coherence of the group re  common objectives and goals will 
also encourage actions by each of the individual mem.bers since everyone 
is fighting for the same cause. Local citizens groups where members are 
concerned that the proposed project threatens their safety, or environ- 
mental groups with a concern for land-use degradation from the project, 
are thus likely to invest considerable resources into opposing the facility. 
These small but powerful contingents should be contrasted with the more 
diffuse set  of individuals benefiting from the project but remaining pas- 
sive because they do not feel that their own efforts will affect the out- 
come of the process (O'Hare 1977). As we shall see later in the California 
case, the actions of a local citizens group in one of the proposed sites had 
a significant impact with respect to the siting process. 
SEQUENTIAL DECISION PROCESS 
Another feature of the facility siting problem is that the process is 
characterized by sequential decisions. March (1978) notes that individu- 
als and groups simplify a large problem into small subproblems because 
of the difficulty they have in assimilating all alternatives and information. 
Often constraints due to legislation and legal considerations dictate the 
order in which certain actions must be taken. 
If the process is sequential in nature then the setting of an agenda is 
likely to play a role in determining the final outcome as well as the length 
of time it takes to reach it. By agenda setting we are referring to the 
order in whch different subproblems are considered. There is strong 
empirical evidence from the field. as well as from laboratory experiments 
(Cobb and Elder 1975; and Levine and Plott 1977) that different agendas 
for the same problem frequently lead to different outcomes. 
There a r ~  two principal reasons for t h s .  Once a particular decision 
has been made on a subproblem this serves as a constraint for the next 
subproblem. If the order of the subproblems is reversed then there 
would likely be a different set of choices to consider. Secondly, each sub- 
problem involves a different set of interested parties who bring with them 
their own set  of data to bolster their cause. The timing of the release of 
this information may have an effect on later actions. For example, 
citizens groups normally enter  the scene with respect to siting problems 
only when their own community is being considered as a possible candi- 
date. The data on the risks associated with siting would be released a t  a 
slower rate (but perhaps with greater  emphasis and more political 
impact) if only one site was considered a t  a time than if all potential sites 
were evaluated simultaneously. 
ROLE OF EXOGENOUS EVENTS 
Another important concept, whch  relates to the uncertainty of infor- 
mation on probabilities and losses, is the importance of exogenous events 
in influencing the decision process. Random events, such as disasters, 
often play a critical role in triggering specific actions to "prevent" future 
crises and call attention to the dangers associated with a particular tech- 
nology. The small data base for judging the frequency of low probability 
events, coupled with systematic biases of individuals in dealing with con- 
cepts of chance and uncertainty, increases the importance of a salient 
event in the decisionmaking process. Tversky and Kahneman (1 974) 
describe this phenomenon under the heading of availability, whereby one 
judges the frequency of a event by the ease with which one can retrieve it 
from memory. 
Fischhoff, Lictenstein and Slovic (in press) summarize their recent 
experimental studies on perceived risks by cataloguing the nature of indi- 
vidual estimates on the probability of occurrence and consequence of dif- 
ferent types of hazards. One of their principal conclusions is that these 
estimates are labile and likely to change over time because of salient 
events which are highlighted by mass media coverage. In a similar spirit, 
March and Olsen (1976) suggest that random events and their timing play 
a role in many organizational decisions because of the ambiguity of many 
situations and the limited attention that can be given to any particular 
problem by the interested parties unless it is perceived as being critical. 
They provide empirical evidence to support their theory using empirical 
studies of organizations in Denmark, Norway and the United States. 
With respect to legislative decisionmaking Walker (1977) suggests the 
importance of graphically and easily understood evidence of trouble as an 
important factor in setting the discretionary agenda of the U.S. Congress 
or a government agency. He also suggests that the political appeal of 
dealing with a specific problem is increased if it has an impact on large 
numbers of people. To support these points, Walker presents empirical 
evidence on the passage of safety legislation in the U.S. Numerous exarn- 
ples of this process are also provided by Lawless (1977) through a series 
of case hst.ories of problems involving the impact of technology on 
society. He points out th.at frequently: 
new information of a n  "alarming" nature is announced and is 
given rapid and widespread visibility by means of modern mass 
commu~~ications media. Almost overnight the case can bec0rn.e 
a subject of discussion and concern to much of the populace, 
and generate strong pressures to evaluate and remedy the prob- 
lem as rapidly as possible (p .  16). 
In the case of decisions such as the siting of facilities, exogenous 
events such as an LNG explosion or an oil spill may be sufficiently graphic 
and affect enough people to cause a reversal of earlier decisions, inject 
other alternatives into the  process and change the relative strength of 
parties interested in the  decision outcome. The mass media may play a 
critical role in focusing on these specific events and in many cases exag- 
gerating their importance. 
III. A MULTI-ATTRIBUTE MULTI PARTY MODEL OF CHOICE 
The above concepts a r e  now incorporated into a model of sequential 
decision making for large-scale projects such as facility siting. The 
approach, which has been influenced by the work of Braybrooke (1974), 
focuses on more than one attribute and involves many interested parties. 
Hence we have called it the Multi-Attribute Multi-Party (MAMP) model.' 
The MAMP model will be described using an illustrative example: the siting 
3 of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in California . It is thus useful to  
provide a brief background on the nature of the siting problem. 
LNG is a potential source of energy whch  requires a fairly corn.pli- 
cated technological process tha t  has the potential, albeit with very low 
probability, of creating severe losses. To import LNG the gas has to  be 
 or a more detailed description of the MAMP model see Kunreuther, Lathrop and Linnerooth 
b~em). 
For a more detailed discussion of the California Case see Lathrop (1981) and Linnerooth (lem). 
converted to liquid form a t  about 1/600 the volume. It is shipped in spe- 
cially constructed tankers and received at  a terminal where it undergoes 
regasification and is then distributed. The entire system (i.e.,  the 
liquefaction facility, the LNG tanker and the receiving terminal and 
regasification facility) can cost more than $1 billion to construct (Office 
of Technology Assessment 1977). The siting problem in the United States 
revolves around the issues of whether LNG imports are in the national 
energy interest and if so, whether the proposed project is considered safe 
enough, 
ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL 
Figure 2 provides a schematic diagram of the M-4MP model. The deci- 
sion process can be separated into different rounds which are labeled by 
capital letters, A, B .... A round is simply a conveni.ent device to illustrate 
a change in the focus of discussions either because (1) a key decision was 
taken (or a stalemate reached due to conflicts among parties) or (2) a 
change occurred in the context of the discussions due to  an  exogenous 
event, entrance of a new party or new evidence to the debate. A round is 
initiated by a formal or informal request by one or more of the interested 
parties. In California Round A began in September 1974 when the appli- 
cant filed for approval of three sites on the California Coast--Point Con- 
ception, Oxnard and Los Angeles-to receive gas from Ind-onesia. 
No mat ter  how a round, is initiated it is characterized by a uniqu.e 
problem formulation w h c h  is presented in the forrn of a set of alterna- 
tives. There can be several decisions made in any round but by definition 
F i g u r e  2 .  M u l t i - A t t r i b u t e  M u l t i - P a r t y  Model  (MAMP) o f  c h o i c e .  
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they are  based on the same set of alternatives. Each alternative is 
characterized by a se t  of attributes whlch may be viewed differently by 
each of the interested parties. In Round A the alternatives were whether 
one or more of the proposed sites for an  LNG terminal was acceptable. 
There were four primary attributes used for the ensuing debate among 
the parties. The need for LNG and the risk of an interruption in the  sup- 
ply of natural gas were arguments for supporting the location of a termi- 
nal in a t  least one of the three proposed sites. Environmental and land 
use considerations suggested a non-remote site (Los Angeles, or Oxnard) 
while the risks to the  population argued for siting the terminal in a 
remote area (Point Conception). Finally concerns about earthquake risk 
brought about opposition to the Los Angeles site, which was found to be 
crossed by a significant fault. 
There were several in.terested parties in Round A which can be refer- 
enced to the four groups depicted in Figure 1. The applicant for the ter- 
minal was Western LNG Terminal Associates, a special company se t  up to 
represent the  LNG siting interests of the three gas distribution utilities: 
Southern California Gas Company, Pacific Gas and Electric, and El Paso 
Natural Gas Company. At the proposed s i tes ,  each of the city councils 
evaluated the proposed terminal in their jurisdiction by looking a t  the tax 
revenues and jobs i t  promised to provide. These positive features had to 
be weighed against the negative impacts that the facility might have on 
land use and risk to the population. 
With respect to government agencies, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) determines whether a proposed LNG project is in the 
public interest and should be  allowed and the California Coastal 
Commission (CCC) has the responsibility of protecting the California 
coastline. Finally, the public interest groups, represented by the Sierra 
Club and local citizens groups, were primarily concerned with safety and 
environmental issues. 
Each of the interested parties states its preference over the dif- 
ferent alternatives and constructs arguments to defend its preference by 
focusing on different attributes. During t h s  interaction phase certain 
decisions are made. In the case of Round A in California two key decisions 
were taken. First, the CCC favored Point Conception over the non-remote 
sites claiming that the decrease in population risk outweighed the 
increase in environmental degradation. Second, the FERC disapproved of 
the Port of Los Angeles because a recently discovered earthquake fault 
increased the seismic risk above an acceptable threshold. 
Round A was concluded with a potential stalemate perceived by the 
gas industry. Los Angeles would not receive federal (FERC) approval. 
Oxnard was not likely to receive state (CCC) approval and Point Concep- 
tion faced difficult challenges a t  the county and state levels because of its 
adverse land-use impacts. We have summarized the elements of Round A 
in Table 1. 
The siting process in California can be characterized by four rounds 
(A ... D) as shown in Table 2. Round B resulted in the passage of the LNG 
siting Act of 1977 whch was designed to break the stalemate a t  the end of 
Round A. Its principal feature was that the CCC nominates and ranks 
potential sites for an LNG terminal in additional to those whch  the 
Western LNG Terminal Associates applies for. The California Public U-tili- 
ties Commission, the principal state body involved in power plant issues, 
Table 1: Elements of Round A 
Problem Def ini t ion  : Should any of t h e  proposed s i t e s  be approved? 
That is: Does Ca l i fo rn ia  need LNG, and i f  so ,  
which, i f  any, of the  proposed s i t e s  i s  appropr ia te?  
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Applicant f i l e s  f o r  approval of t h r e e  s i t e s .  
Al ternat ives :  S i t e  a t  Point  Conception: 
S i t e  a t  Oxnard: 
S i t e  a t  Us Angeles: 
S i t e  a t  any combination of 
In te rac t ion :  
Involved P a r t i e s  
Applicant 1 
FERC 
CCC 
Ci ty  Councils P6 
0 
S i e r r a  Club P7 
Att r ibu tes  Used a s  Arguments 
Supply Lnterruption Risk 
Supply In te r rup t ion  Risk 
Earthquake Risk 
Population Risk 
Population Risk Land Use Quali ty 
Population Risk Land Use Quali ty 
Local Ci t izens  P8 Population Risk Land Use Quali ty 
Key Decisions : 
1. Point  Conception p re fe r red  t o  Oxnard and Us Angeles, based on t h e  
f a c t  that t h e  decrease in  population r i s k  outweighs t h e  increase  
in environmental degradation. 
2. Us Angeles would no t  be approved because t h e  seismic r i s k  i s  
g r e a t e r  than an acceptable  threshold.  
conclusion: 
Applicant perceives  a s ta lemate ,  i . e . ,  , t h a t  no s i t e  i s  approvable without 
long delay.  
Table 2: Summazy of Rounds i n  Cal i fornia  LXG S i t i n g  Case 
ROUND X Date 
-
Problem Definition: Should *he proposed s i t e s  be approved? 
That is: Does Califo.mia need LNG, and 
i f  SO, which, i f  any, of t he  proposed 
sites is appropriate? 
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Applicant f i l e s  f o r  e r o v a l  of th ree  s i t e s .  September 1974 
(34 montias) 
Conclusion: Applicant perceives that no s i t e  is J'uly 1977 
a ~ r o v a b l e  without long delay 
ROUND B 
Problem Definit ion: How should need f o r  W G  be determined? 
I f  need is establ ished,  haw should an 
UJG f a c i l i t y  be s i t e d ?  
L n i t i a t b g  Event: Applicant and others put  pressure  on s t a t e  Ju ly  1977 
l e g i s l a t u r e  t o  r ' ac i l i  t a t e  LNG s i t i n g .  (2 months 
Conclusion: New s i t i n g  pmcess  set up t h a t  e s s e n t i a l l y  Septeznber 1977 
assumes a need f o r  UJG, and is designed 
to acce le ra te  L;NG terminal s i t i n g .  
Problem Definition: Which s i t e  should be approved? 
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: A ~ p l i c a n t  f i l e s  f o r  anproval of Point October 1977 
Conception s i t e  . ( 10 months) 
Conclusion: S i t e  approved condi t ional  on consicieraticn Ju ly  1978 
of addi t iona l  seismic r i s k  data. 
Problem Definition: Is Point  Conception seismical ly  safe? 
I n i t i a t i n g  Event: Regulatory agencies set up procedures t o  
consider addi t iona l  seismic r i s k  data. 
Conclusion: (Round s t i l l  i n  progress) 
selects a site from the CCC list, not necessarily the top ranked site. In 
Round C which occurred during the summer of 1977 the CCC ranked four 
sites (Camp Pendleton, Rattlesnake Canyon, Point Conception, and Deer 
Canyon) in that order and the CPUC chose Point Conception, conditional 
on it being a seismically safe location. Round D is still in progress with 
the FERC and CPUC examining seismic data whch will determine whether 
Point Conception is seismically safe. 
Whether an LNG terminal will ever be sited a t  Point Conception is an 
open question since the enthusiasm of the applicant for an LNG terminal 
has now waned considerably since they proposed the three sites back in 
1972. In addition, there are two sets of wealthy landholders owning adja- 
cent tracts of land to Point Conception: the Hollister and Bixby Ranches. 
These landholders are attempting to do everythng in their legal power to 
prevent the siting process at Point Conception and so far have managed 
to stall any action. 
INTERPRETATION OF THE MODEL 
The MAMP decision process in California reflects the basic concepts 
which were outlin-ed in Section 11. As indicated by the scenario of the four 
rounds, there were different interested parties who interacted with each 
other a t  each stage of the process. There were three broad categories of 
concern which are relevant to t h s  problem: risk aspects, economic 
aspects, and environmental aspects. Each of these concerns can be 
described by a set of attributes. Table 3 depicts an interested 
party/concern matrix showing the main attributes considered by each of 
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the relevant groups over the seven year period. It is clear from this table 
that  each of the parties brought to the debate their own special interests. 
The applicant's primary concerns are earning profits for shareholders 
and delivering gas reliably to consumers. Hence the emphasis on the 
need for gas, profit considerations and price of gas as the relevant fac- 
tors. The federal and state government agencies concerns were specified 
by legislation; local governments compared the economic benefits with 
environmental and safety factors. Public interest groups, like the Sierra 
Club and local citizens groups, focused their attention on the environmen- 
tal aspects and safety risks associated with the project. 
The case also illustrates the importance of a small but powerful 
interested party--the Oxnard citizens group--in influencing legislative 
actions. Until the publication in 1976 of a worst case scenario associated 
with a proposed 1300 million terminal in Oxnard, there was almost unani- 
mous agreement by all stakeholders that  t h s  community would be an 
ideal site for an LNG terminal. At the time even the Sierra Club was in 
favor of this location. (they changed their feelings about Oxnard in 1977). 
A worse case scenario indicated that a spill of 125,000 cubic meters of 
LNG from all five tanks on a tanker would cause a vapor cloud which would 
affect 50,000 people. Residents could look on a map to determi.ne 
whether the cloud covered one's own house (Ah.ern 1980). No estimate of 
a probability was attached to t h s  scenario. 
The graphc  depiction of these consequences generated a public 
reaction by a small group organized by concerned citizens of Ventura 
County. The California legislature was influenced by this public reaction. 
One legislative staff member stressed that it was not possible to allow a 
site that  would lead to a large number of deaths in a catastrophe. 4 
Hence, new siting regulations were passed stating that no more than an  
average of 10 people per square mile could be within one mile of the ter- 
minal and no more than 60 withn four miles of the terminal. The 
President 's National Energy Plan incorporated similar population guide- 
lines which effectively ruled out any high density areas as candidates for 
a n  LNG terminal. 
Interestingly enough the risk assessment used by the  citizens group 
a t  Oxnard was only one of three commissioned by different interested 
parties for this site. The assessments commissioned by the applicant and 
the  FERC showed very low numbers and were interpreted to mean that  
the  risk was acceptable. The risk assessment commissioned by the 
Oxnard municipal government and used by the citizens group also had low 
probabilities, but in its report i t  described maximum credible accidents 
without the accompanying probabilities (Mandl and Lathrop 1981). 
The sequent ia l  decis ion process is self-explanatory based on the four 
rounds depicted in Table 2. Thls process may facilitate decisions a t  each 
stage by limiting the number of parties but i t  can have negative long- 
range consequences. For example, the need for imported natural gas has 
greatly diminished in California but th.e possibility of siting a terminal is 
still alive. Poi.nt Conception has been deemed an  acceptable site subject 
to a sei.smic risk study. Due to the nature of th.e siting process, the only 
way this site would be unacceptable is if the seismic risk was found t o  be 
too high. Rather than stating that California may not need LNG, the 
 his comment was made to John Lathrop in an interview in Sacramento, California, in July 
1980, regarding the siting process of an LNG terminal. 
relevant interested parties have preferred to delay the findings of the 
seismic risk studies (Lathrop 1981). 
Another example of the long-range negative effects of the sequential 
constraints is the case of a supply interruption risk. Initially the appli- 
cant  proposed three separate sites to minimize the risk of California hav- 
ing a shortage of natural gas. When the decisidn process eliminated two 
of the three proposed terminals, Western Associates proposed the con- 
struction of a large facility a t  Point Conception capable of producing a 
throughput of 58,000 m3 LNG/day, equivalent in energy flow to  roughly 15 
modern nuclear reactor units (Mandl and Lathrop 1981). By concentrat- 
ing the facilities a t  one port the supply interruption risk will now likely be 
increased ra ther  than decreased, if Point Conception is approved and 
actually utilized. 
Finally turning to the ro le  of exogenous  e v e n t s  in California there is 
one incident which had an impact on the decision making process. In 
December 1976 the Los Angeles City Council voted to allow work to begin 
on an LNG terminal in San Pedro Bay. The following day an explosion 
ripped the oil tanker Sansinea in Los Angeles harbor, leaving 9 dead and 
50 injured. A week later the City Council commissioned a study as to the 
relative safety of the proposed site. They later approved the terminal. 
This explosion, although i t  had nothng to do with liquefied natural gas, 
alerted many Californians to the potential dangers of LNG. 
On a more general level, two disasters in other parts of the country 
illustrate the importance that exogenous events have had on the decision 
process with respect to LNG siting and regulations. 
In 1973 an LNG tank in Staten Island, New York, exploded and the 
roof collapsed burying 40 workers. There was no LNG in the tank but it 
had seeped through the insulation and caused a huge fire. A result of this 
explosion was the increased concern with the dangers of LNG by Staten 
Island residents. The neighborhood organization which was formed a year 
before the accident, attracted considerable attention and interest 
because of the media coverage of the tank explosion. In the context of 
the MAMP model a new interested party played a key role because of an 
exogenous event. What may have been a foregone decision regarding the 
location of an LNG tank in Staten Island became problematical (Davis 
1979). 
The worst LNG accident occurred in 1944 when the storage tank 
operated by the East Ohio Gas Company in Cleveland ruptured, spilling 
LNG on adjacent streets and sewers. The liquid evaporated, the gas 
ignited and exploded, resulting in 128 deaths, 300 injuries and approxi- 
mately $7 million in property damage. An investigation of this accident 
indicated that the tank failed because it was constructed of 3.5% nickel 
steel, which becomes brittle when it comes in contact with the extreme 
cold of LNG. All plants are now built with 9% nickel steel, aluminum or 
concrete and the storage tanks are surrounded by dikes capable of con- 
taining the contents of the tank if a rupture occurs (Davis 1979). This 
example illustrates the impact of a particular incident on new regula- 
tions, which otherwise may not have been passed. 
W. IMPROVING THE DECISION PROCESS: PRESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
The siting process for LEG terminals in California has provided a 
graphc  description of the conflicts which exist be tween different 
interested parties, each of whom have their own goals and objectives. The 
party/concern matrix depicts the different attributes used to defend 
positions; the MAMP model reveals the dynamics of the decision process 
and the relevant constraints whch determined the outcomes at  the end 
of each of the different rounds. 
LESSONS FROM THE MAMP MODEL 
A retrospective view of the situation through the eyes of the MAMP 
model provides the following insights which may have relevance for 
prescription. 
1. There is little articulation of value judgments by the different 
parties. Each of the groups has a set  of objectives and related 
attributes which they are willing to articulate but there has 
been no statement by anyone as to the importance weights 
assigned to the different attributes in the problem. This obser- 
vation coincides with Ward Edwards experience in attempting to 
use multi-attribute utility analysis in evaluating alternative 
school desegregation plans submitted by external groups to the 
Los Angeles School Board. He has noted that  the interested par- 
ties in a societal decision problem are unlikely to reveal their 
value structure because t h s  information would then be public 
and they would be accountable for numerical judgments 
(Edwards 198i). For this reason it will be difficult to utilize this 
technique as a way of determining preferences between alterna- 
tive s . 
Constraints guiding the decision process are not stable but may 
change over time as new information is injected into the process 
by one or more interested parties. A n  interesting example is 
the present concern that seismic risk is a potential problem for 
siting a facility at  Point Conception, even though t b s  risk had 
not surfaced in earlier discussions of the feasibility of the site. 
Another illustration is the ability of the Oxnard citizens group to 
mfluence new legislation on siting criteria by focusing on the 
number of deaths from a catastrophic accident rather than on 
the extremely low probability of such a disaster actually occur- 
ring. These examples illustrate the point made by Majone (in 
press) that actual policies are determined in the world of insti- 
tutional choice where each of the interested parties are 
attempting to modify rules of the game which constrain them 
from achieving their goals and objectives. 
The siting of sophisticated technologies is a process that is not 
well understood scientifically so that there are no measures of 
risk which can be pinpointed using statistical analysis. Hence 
each of the interested parties has an opportunity to focus on dif- 
ferent measures to support their position. The conflicting risk 
assessments for evaluating the safety of an LNG terminal in pro- 
posed sites has been well documented by Mandl and Lathrop 
(1981) for the four IIASA case studies. Each of several different 
interested parties, commissioned a special risk study and used 
the results for their own purposes. 
Given these observations what can be done to improve the situation? 
One of the most important aspects of the MAMP descriptive model is that  
it enables the policy analyst to focus on the actual siting process and to  
evaluate its success on the basis of several different dimensions. The 
standard analytic tools such as multi-attribute utility analysis or  
cost/benefit analysis have normally focused on outcomes rather than 
process. There is no reason why one cannot focus on how well different 
procedures score with respect to a well-defined set of objectives. 
The first step in undertaking this type of analysis would be to specify 
the  relative importance of different attributes,one would like a process to  
satisfy. One of these attributes might be related to how well the final 
choice performs with respect to resource allocation, but there is also 
likely to be a set  of attributes which reflect the way different interested 
parties feel about the process as well as the outcome? For example, did 
each interested party have a n  opportunity to voice its position? Were a 
wide enough set  of alternatives considered so that the parties felt that  a 
choice was actually being made? These factors may be important in some 
type of cultural settings but less relevant in others. The policy analyst 
can also point out that  a more elaborate process takes time, another 
dimension to be considered in the evaluation procedure. By articulating 
the  types of tradeoffs which have to be made in choosing one type of pro- 
cedure over another, the analyst can provide guidance to  policy makers 
as to what the decision process they may want to consider in the future. 
THE USE OF GERT 
The MAMP model also may be a useful tool for analyzing how alterna- 
tive procedures are  likely to  fare for a given problem context. In reality 
the decisions made in any round are  probabilistic with the  chances of dif- 
ferent outcomes determined by the party/concern matrix and the pro- 
cedures which one employs. One way to  modify the MAMP model to incor- 
porate these elements of uncertainty is to employ the concepts of 
another technique--GERT (Graphical Evaluation and Review Technique)--to 
structure the process. GERT is a combination of network theory, proba- 
bility theory and simulation and was developed by Alan Pritsker (1966) to 
analyze the terminal countdown on an Apollo space system. 5 
The basic features of GERT can be illustrated through a prospective 
view of the California siting decision. Figure 3 depicts the scenario using 
the  symbolic features introduced by Pritsker. The two key concepts for 
understanding a process a r e  activities and nodes. An activlty is an actual 
operation or process which takes time and consumes resources. A node 
is a point in time which either represents the start  or completion of one 
or more activities. Activities are  represented by arrows while nodes are 
represented by either circles or loops. 
 or an excelent description of the modeling feat'xes and capabilities of GE:R'I' ir~ciuding i ts  
application in r e d  world problems see Moore and Clayton (1 976). 

To illustrate this graphical notation consider Figure 3. Nodes 1, 2, 
and 3 represent the  s tar t  of the activities in Round A associated with sit- 
ing at  Point Conception, Oxnard, and Los Angeles. For simplicity each of 
the questions inside the three nodes is assumed to  have either a "yes" or 
"no" answera6 and the respective probabilities of a "yes" answer a re  given 
by the values Pi i = 1,2,3. The policy analyst, in consultation with different 
interested parties, could assign appropriate figures to these probabilities. 
The two different shapes of the nodes reflect the nature of the possi- 
ble outcomes for activities emanating from them. The looped nodes such 
as 1,2, and 3 signify that the outcome is probabilistic. Node 9 is 
represented by a circle indicating that  the outcome is certain (i.e., there 
will be a ranking the sites given the fact that one or more of them have 
been found to be acceptable (from Node 8)). The ouLcomes of the process 
will also be circles as indicated by Nodes 4-6 and Nodes 11 and 12. 
The GERT approach is considerably more sophisticated than Figure 3 
implies. Estimates can be made for the expected completion time of 
each activity with appropriate probabilities reflecting uncertainty as t o  
how long a given process may take. In addition one can have network 
looping, whereby if one reaches a certain stage of Lhe process one must 
return to an earlier node. 
The use of GERT to stru.cture the  key questions and activities dep- 
icted in the MAMP model provides a vehicle for prescriptive analysis. It 
enables the policy analyst to  develop alternative scenarios and likely 
'h reality there would undoubtedly be a variety of possible answers t o  these questions. For 
example, a response could have been a "Conditional Yes" subject to  more data on seismic 
risk. For ease of exposition we are also assurning that the  decisiorls regarding the three sites 
are independent of each other when in reality they are llkely t o  be interrelated. 
outcomes by changing the nature of the decision process. The following 
types of questions could be directly addressed: 
What is the likely impact on the different activities and nodes if 
some of the existing constraints are relaxed? For example, sup- 
pose that  experts were explicitly brought into the process to  
at tempt t o  arrive a t  consensual judgments regarding specific 
risks and that the interested parties have to abide by their find- 
ings. What impact would t h s  have on the likely outcomes? 7 
What would be the impact on the process if certain parties were 
given power which they currently do not have? For example, 
suppose that  a specific regulatory agency was given full author- 
ity to rank and approve a specific site in California. What differ- 
ence would t h s  make on the scenario and final outcome? 
What would happen if there was a change in the way alternative 
sites were introduced into the picture? For example suppose 
the gas companies decided to propose only one site a t  a time for 
locating a terminal. How would t h s  affect the interaction 
between different interested parties and the alternative out- 
comes? In this type of scenario one would first have to deter- 
mine the order of the sites to be introduced and the  relevant 
nodes and activities should a particular site by approved or 
deemed infeasible? 
' 7 ~  discussion of the potential role of experts in the LNG siting decision in California appears 
in Stoto (in press). 
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY TRADEOFFS 
These alternative scenarios provide a menu of options which can be 
considered by the relevant interested parties. They do not imply that one 
process is better than another. Thls judgment reflects the tradeoffs 
between efficiency and equity that have become so prominent in the 
recent literature on social choice. Schelling (1981) has provided an 
interesting perspective on this problem by indicating that in theory a 
pricing system can be combined with appropriate income transfers to 
achieve efficient outcomes whlch are also equitable to different groups of 
people. The reality of the situation, as Schelling is quick to point out, is 
that political constraints may not permit one to use the pricing system. 
One may not be able to reallocate funds to a particular group because of 
budget restrictions. Similarly a specific governmental body may have 
responsibility for deciding on a particular question and will base its deci- 
sion so it best satisfies its own goals. 
The MAMP model coupled with GERT can provide insight as to when 
political considerations are likely to foreclose certain outcomes whlch 
may have desirable economic features. For example, a particular 
scenario may reveal that a community is likely to be opposed to  a given 
site and will fight hard to stop its approval because they feel that the 
increased risks which they must bear are too hlgh. If this project is 
socially beneficial, then it may be useful to investigate some way to com- 
pensate the local community who will suffer from the project. 
O'Hare (1977) has proposed a particular type of compensation 
scheme whereby each community proposed as a potential site deter- 
mines a minimum level of per capita compensation such that it is willing 
to  make a legal commitment to have the project in their backyard if the 
compensation is paid. The applicant would utilize this compensation as 
pa r t  of h s  calculations as to the relevant costs associated with locating 
the facilities in community A, B or C. The final decision would then be 
made by the applicant taking into account the amount of compensation it 
would have to pay residents in each of these three localities. 
T h s  type of system would only be applied to potential sites that  had 
satisfied specific governmental criteria related to  safety and environmen- 
tal risk. O'Hare recognizes that there will still be some individuals in a 
given community who will be compensated more than they need to be and 
others who will not be rewarded enough. He also recognizes that  for such 
a system to be implemented there must be good information on the 
relevant costs, including an  environmental impact statement,  and that  
the  system has to be designed to  overcome the incentive to overbid. 
Whether or not some type of compensation scheme is a useful policy 
prescription depends on the specifics of the situation. In t h s  connection, 
it would be interesting to  ask what type of payments would have been 
required to appease the  citizens of Oxnard so that  an  LNG terminal could 
have been located there? What would the Sierra Club require in payments 
so that  they would support a site which might; have adverse environment 
effects? These questions can only be answered in a real world problem 
context. They do reflect a n  increasing concern of economists an.d lawyers 
in dealing with windfalls or wipeouts from specific actions whlch involve 
the  public sector. Hagman and Misczynski (1978) in their comprehensive 
study of the subject believe that  windfalls should be partially recaptured 
to help compensate for wipeouts. They propose a number of alternative 
mechanisms for ameliorating this problem ranging from special assess- 
ments to development permits. These types of policy instruments could 
also be investigated in the context of specific siting problems. 
After all is said and done the final outcome is likely to represent 
some type of balance between the political constraints and economic cri- 
teria. As Wildavsky (1981) has pointed out: 
The criterion of choice in politics and markets is not being right 
or  correct  as in solving a puzzle, but agreement based on 
interaction among partially opposed interests (p .  133) 
The MAMP model will not tell any politician how one should deal with the 
equity/efficiency dilemma but a t  least it uncovers some of the specific 
causes of these conflicts. How one actually improves the process is a 
challenge for the future. 
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